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Abstract 
Previous research on moral licensing demonstrates that individuals who behave morally 
are less willing to help in the future; but is this still the case when the cost of helping is 
low? The present thesis examined the effects of moral licensing on prosocial behavior 
that is high in cost-to-self and low in cost-to-self. Contrary to past literature, participants 
in the control condition did not rate themselves as more willing to help than participants 
who felt morally licensed. This presents a need for more thorough research on the 
mechanisms of moral licensing. Participants did, however, rate themselves as more 
willing to help when the cost-to-self was low than when the cost-to-self was high. These 
findings are important for understanding how moral licensing works, specifically with 
respect to cost of helping, to predict when people are likely or not likely to engage in 
moral behaviors.  
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Moral Licensing  
 Moral licensing is a phenomenon in which individuals feel confident enough in 
their morality to refrain from acting morally in the future (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 
2010). People with a strong moral identity (e.g., a person that has just helped) are more 
likely to then engage in immoral behavior because it is not a threat to their positive self-
concept (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin 2009). They maintain a self-view that is consistent 
with their previous behavior and have proof through that moral deed that they are a moral 
person. They therefore feel entitled to act immorally without feeling like an immoral 
person. 
 Moral licensing includes the moral credits approach and the moral credentials 
approach (Merritt et al., 2010). The moral deed a licensed person performed can serve as 
a moral credit which is added to the individual’s personal account of acts, both moral and 
immoral. A person feels licensed when their moral account maintains more helping acts 
than harmful acts, and they therefore will not feel guilty for spending some moral credits 
on immoral behavior—they can afford it (Merritt et al., 2010). The moral deed can also 
be a means by which the person interprets a morally ambiguous behavior. In the moral 
credentials approach, the prosocial deed can inform the morality of a subsequent act in 
light of the individual’s past behavior, yielding a second kind of licensing (Merritt et al., 
2010). It was hypothesized that participants in the present study would feel they had 
gathered enough moral credit to excuse refraining from further moral behavior, or their 
moral credentials would frame the act of withholding help as not immoral in the first 
place. 
Consistency vs. Compensation 
 Moral behavior can result in either morally compensatory behavior or morally 
consistent behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012). Whether a moral deed licenses an 
individual to subsequently engage in immoral activity or remain consistent with their 
moral identity depends on the nature of the moral behavior itself. Recalling one’s moral 
identity in an abstract way (e.g., labeling one’s self as charitable or generous) tends to 
result in behavior consistent with that conceptualized identity (Conway & Peetz, 2012; 
Strenta & Dejong, 1981). On the other hand, if a person recalls a concrete moral act 
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performed, they are more likely to perceive that act as a moral credit and feel licensed to 
engage in immoral behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Schadeva et al., 2009). For the 
present study, participants recalled specific and recent moral acts in an attempt to yield 
licensing. 
Prescriptive Immorality 
 The present thesis is concerned with prescriptive immorality, a subset of 
immorality in which a person refrains from helping. As opposed to proscriptive 
immorality, which involves doing things we should not, prescriptive immorality involves 
failing to do things we should (Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012). Prescriptive immorality 
is vague, in that it does not involve action, and occurs in the absence of an incentive to 
help. People are less motivated to behave prosocially (i.e., are not looking for moral 
credits) when they feel licensed, which is why moral licensing can often result in 
prescriptive immorality (Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012). Helping, in general, is a 
prescriptive act in that it is voluntary and positive; the present study examined moral 
licensing in the prescriptive domain of morality only. 
High-Cost and Low-Cost Helping Behavior 
 Moral behavior licenses a person to engage in prescriptive immorality when the 
helping behavior comes at a high cost (i.e., requiring the use of time or effort) (Conway 
& Peetz, 2012; Schadeva et al., 2009). It frees them from the guilt associated with 
withholding help because they feel as if they have done their moral duty and they are free 
from feeling responsible. Although behaving altruistically is costly by definition 
(Schadeva et al., 2009), the present study was interested in whether morally licensed 
individuals feel entitled to refrain from performing prosocial acts that come at a low cost 
(e.g., lending out a garden tool that you never use or letting someone cut you in the 
check-out line when you are in no rush). Research has shown that licensed individuals are 
less likely to help when the proposed helping behavior will cost them a significant 
amount of resources (Schadeva et al., 2009); however, research has not yet examined the 
effects of moral licensing on participation in low-cost helping behaviors. This was the 
goal of the present study: to understand the influence of moral licensing on low-cost 
helping behaviors in contrast with high-cost helping behaviors. 
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Limitations of Previous Research 
 Previous research has found evidence for an effect of moral licensing on 
prescriptive immorality when the prosocial act withheld would cost the individual 
significant resources. However, research has not yet examined the influence of the cost of 
helping on the likelihood of helping behavior after being morally licensed. That is, does 
the cost of the moral action have an impact on the effects of moral licensing such that 
low-cost helping behaviors are excused from the effects of the moral licensing 
phenomenon, or are they impacted in the same way as high-cost helping behaviors? The 
present study sought to examine this influence of cost on engagement in helping 
behaviors after moral licensing. 
Method 
 To examine the role of cost on helping behaviors after moral licensing, 121 
participants (87 female, 34 male) were recruited from Introductory Psychology courses at 
the University of Dayton. The data of 9 participants were removed before analysis due to 
errors. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either a licensing condition or a control 
condition. They came into the lab and were either asked to write about a topic that relates 
to morality or an event unrelated to morality. The participants in the licensing condition 
were asked to write about a time when they “acted in such a way that they felt righteous 
or honorable…” The same licensing mechanism developed by Conway & Peetz (2012) 
was employed (with permission from the authors) in the present study. The participants in 
the control condition were asked to recall what they ate for dinner over the past week, a 
control condition (used successfully in previous research by Dr. O’Mara) that provides 
the participants with a task that is independent of morality. 
 Next, participants were randomly assigned to read three short scenarios that called 
for either high-cost or low-cost levels of helping. They then rated their willingness to 
help in each scenario on a scale from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely (Conway & 
Peetz, 2012). When the participants finished reading and evaluating the scenarios, they 
completed demographic questions. Finally, the researcher told the students that the study 
had ended, and the participants were debriefed. 
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Results 
 A 2 (Moral Licensing: yes, no) x 2 (Cost: high, low) ANOVA was conducted to 
examine whether moral licensing and cost interacted to predict helping and whether there 
were main effects for moral licensing and cost on helping. A key interest was whether 
morally licensed participants in the low-cost condition were significantly more willing to 
help than morally licensed participants in the high-cost conditions. This would allow us 
to conclude that the cost of helping is an important predictor and limitation of the effects 
of moral licensing on helping behavior. If morally licensed participants in the low-cost 
condition were not significantly more willing to help than morally licensed participants in 
the high-cost condition, it would suggest that moral licensing affects helping behavior, 
regardless of the cost of helping. 
 The results indicated that the interaction between moral licensing and cost was not 
significant, F(1, 108) = 0.00, p = 0.99. As Figure 1 illustrates, moral licensing and cost 
did not significantly interact to predict helping behavior. Further, we did not replicate the 
moral licensing effect described in Conway & Peetz (2012). The analysis did not indicate 
a significant main effect of moral licensing on helping behavior, F(1, 108) = 3.06, p = 
0.08. In fact, we found a surprising trend in the opposite direction, such that the 
participants in the moral licensing condition tended to help more (M = 6.226, SD = 0.715) 
than the participants in the control condition (M = 6.040, SD = 0.840). We suspect that 
the licensing manipulation yielded consistency rather than compensatory behavior. 
Participants may not have thought about a concrete example of behaving morally in the 
recent past, and instead perhaps thought of a vague example of their morality, yielding 
behavior consistent with that identity. 
 We found a significant main effect of cost on helping behavior, such that the 
participants were more willing to help in the low cost condition (M = 6.62, SD = 0.47)  
than in the high cost condition (M = 5.67, SD = 0.74), F(1, 108) = 66.60, p <.0001. This 
finding serves as a pilot test for subsequent studies and a manipulation check for our cost 
of helping manipulation. To better test whether helping significantly varied by cost 
without the influence of the moral licensing information, we examined only the data from 
participants in the control condition to examine the effect of cost on helping. There was 
also a significant main effect for cost, F(1, 57) = 28.54, p < .0001, such that the mean 
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willingness to help rating in the low cost condition (M = 6.529, SD = 0.531) was 
significantly higher than the mean willingness to help rating in the high-cost condition (M 
= 5.567, SD = 0.817), see Figure 2. This indicates that participants who read scenarios 
that were low in cost-to-self rated themselves as significantly more likely to engage in the 
helping behavior described than participants that read scenarios that were high in cost-to-
self.  
Limitations and Discussion 
 First, the present study demonstrated the need for more reliable moral licensing 
manipulations. The initial writing task that participants completed did not succeed in 
licensing the participants in the moral licensing condition in the way that it did in the 
Conway & Peetz (2012) study. Perhaps the present study did not replicate the 
manipulation exactly as Conway & Peetz employed it, or perhaps the manipulation is 
simply not reliable. Whatever the case, more studies should be done to develop this 
manipulation in order to test further hypotheses on moral licensing and its effects. 
 Second, the present study examined participants’ willingness to help in 
hypothetical situations. To obtain more concrete evidence for the effects of moral 
licensing in real-life situations, more research should be conducted to evaluate 
participants’ helping behaviors in actual scenarios. This would allow findings to be 
generalized and to reliably describe the helping behaviors of various populations. 
 Since the present study did find evidence that individuals tend to help more when 
the cost-to-self is low, it would be interesting to see if this trend is maintained when the 
individuals are licensed. The results of this study add to the body of research describing 
when people are likely or not likely to behave morally. They also highlight that the 
present literature on moral licensing needs to be revisited and replicated in order to 
enhance its reliability. Research in the realm of moral licensing is important for 
understanding how humans tend to behave in various situations, specifically when moral 
decision-making is involved. 
Future Directions 
 To reevaluate the moral licensing manipulation, we are conducting a follow-up 
study in which we will use the effective cost manipulation, but alter the moral licensing 
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manipulation. We will construct the moral licensing manipulation based on multiple 
studies, in addition to the Conway & Peetz (2012) article, in order to yield higher 
efficacy. We are also including more specific instructions for the moral writing task, a 
longer period of required writing time, and a filler task to be completed before the 
helping scenarios are read and evaluated. We hope that these changes will result in an 
effective moral licensing manipulation and allow us to study its effects on helping in 
high-cost and low-cost situations. 
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Figure 1. 
Participants’ mean willingness to help across licensing and cost conditions. 
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Figure 2. 
Control participants' mean willingness to help across cost conditions. 
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